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Abstract—The wireless physical-layer identification (WPLI)
techniques utilize the unique features of the physical waveforms
of wireless signals to identify and classify authorized devices.
As the inherent physical layer features are difficult to forge,
WPLI is deemed as a promising technique for wireless security
solutions. However, as of today it still remains unclear whether
existing WPLI techniques can be applied under real-world
requirements and constraints. In this paper, through both the-
oretical modeling and experiment validation, the reliability and
differentiability of WPLI techniques are rigorously evaluated,
especially under the constraints of state-of-art wireless devices,
real operation environments, as well as wireless protocols and
regulations. Specifically, a theoretical model is first established
to systematically describe the complete procedure of WPLI.
More importantly, the proposed model is then implemented to
thoroughly characterize various WPLI techniques that utilize
the spectrum features coming from the non-linear RF-front-end,
under the influences from different transmitters, receivers, and
wireless channels. Subsequently, the limitations of existing WPLI
techniques are revealed and evaluated in details using both the
developed theoretical model and in-lab experiments. The real-
world requirements and constraints are characterized along each
step in WPLI, including i) the signal processing at the transmitter
(device to be identified), ii) the various physical layer features
that originate from circuits, antenna, and environments, iii) the
signal propagation in various wireless channels, iv) the signal
reception and processing at the receiver (the identifier), and v)
the fingerprint extraction and classification at the receiver.
I. Introduction
In wireless communications, the usage of electromagnetic
(EM) waves as signal carrier grants both significant challenges
and unique opportunities to users’ security and privacy. On
the one hand, as the EM waves propagate anywhere within
the physics limit through line-of-sight, reflection, diffraction,
and refraction paths, it is possible for impostors within the
range to participate in the wireless communication. On the
other hand, physical waveforms transmitted by any wireless
device are inherently stamped with unique features in the
physical layer of the communication, which can be utilized to
identify impostors and classify authorized users. Such device
identification solutions are defined as Wireless Physical-Layer
Identification (WPLI) techniques [1].
While the conventional software-level device identifications
(e.g., IP or MAC address) can be easily changed by mal-
wares, the physical layer feature cannot be modified without
significant effort. Therefore, the WPLI technique is deemed
as a promising wireless security solution, if the physical
layer features, or the so called ”radio frequency fingerprints
(RFFs)”, are sufficiently reliable and distinguishable. The
question is: are RFFs reliable and distinguishable in real and
practical applications? Or more specifically, given state-of-
art wireless devices and in real operation environments, can
WPLI techniques reliably and uniquely identify/classify the
authorized users and impostors? The objective of this paper is
to answer the question.
To analyze the reliability and differentiability of RFFs, the
origins of various RFFs need to be point out first. Fig. 1
illustrate the logic procedure of WPLI during the wireless
communication between a transmitter (the device to be identi-
fied) and a receiver (the identifier). The RFFs can come from
many points along that procedure. At the transmitter side, the
RFFs are rooted in the hardware imperfections of the trans-
mitter device [1], which include clock jitter [2], [3], the DAC
sampling error [4], the mixer or local frequency synthesizer
[5], [6], the power amplifier non-linearity [4], [7], [8],device
antenna [9], modulator sub-circuit (if the analog modulation
is used) [10], among others. The EM waves stamped with
the hardware-imperfection-based RFFs are then radiated by
the transmitter antenna to the wireless channel, where another
type of RFFs are added to the physical waveform, i.e., the
unique multipath wireless link characteristics [11], [12]. At
the receiver (i.e., the identifier), the RFF-stamped signals are
received by the receiver antenna and processed through the
analog circuits and digital processing units. Depends on their
properties, different RFFs are extracted at (i) different parts
of the signals, such as turn-on/off transient [6], [13], [14],
[15]; data [2], [9], [16], [17], [18], and clock [2], [3], and (ii)
different domains, such as time [10], frequency [9], [13], and
wavelet domains [10]. Finally the extracted RFF is matched
with the fingerprint database, which complete the physical-
layer identification process.
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Fig. 1. The logic procedure in wireless physical-layer identification.
According to the procedure of WPLI, the factors that can
influence the reliability and differentiability of RFFs include:
(i) the signal preparing procedure (e.g., modulation and shap-
ing filter) at the transmitter before the RFF is added; (ii) the
characteristics of the various hardware imperfections at the
transmitter; (iii) the characteristics of the multipath wireless
channel and the influence of the operation environments; (iv)
the signal reception and processing procedure at the receiver;
and (v) the fingerprint extraction and matching strategy at the
receiver. Based on the five influential factors, the criteria of
reliability and differentiability in WPFL can be specified as:
First, the signal generated at the transmitter should provide
enough resources (e.g., bandwidth and power) to carry the
RFFs to be added. Second, the selected RFFs should be
significantly enough for device identification but negligible to
communication functionalities. Third, the identification results
should not be changed by the effects of EM wave propa-
gations in various wireless channels (e.g., outdoor/indoor or
city/rural) or the mobility of users and other objects in the
vicinity. Fourth, the RFF-stamped signals can be captured by
the off-the-shelf receiver device without additional high-end
measuring equipments. Fifth, using the extracted RFFs, the
identification/classification algorithm gives an error rate lower
than the designed threshold.
In real and practical applications, it could be challenging
for existing WPLI techniques to meet the above five criteria
due to various limitations, such as the constraints in receiver
devices, the impacts of the complex wireless channels, and the
requirements of wireless protocols/regulations. First, although
the reported error rate of many existing WPLI solutions are
impressive (single-digit % error rate), most existing works use
oscilloscopes or spectrum analyzers as the identifier [9], [2],
which has orders of magnitude higher sampling rate (at least
several GHz) than real wireless receivers (e.g., smart phones or
wireless sensors). With the much lower sampling rate (usually
in the order of MHz), real wireless receivers can lose a large
portion of RFFs in higher frequency range and cannot capture
the RFFs from the turn-on/off transient of passband signals
at all. In addition, most reported WPLI results are derived in
open space with an ideal and fixed wireless channel [13]. Many
works even just place the receiver right beside the transmitter
[9]. In fact, practical wireless channel (especially the multipath
channel, which is dominant in indoor and metropolitan envi-
ronments) are highly dynamic and can dramatically distort the
transmitted signals as well as the RFF. Consequently, the small
difference between devices due to the hardware imperfections
will be masked by the strong channel effects. Moreover, most
existing WPLI solutions require updating RFF database each
time when the wireless users or obstructions move or the
WPLI system is placed in a new environment. However, mo-
bility is the fundamental requirement of most current wireless
applications. It is highly impractical if the identifier has to
rebuild the RFF database whenever the users move. Finally,
the close interactions between WPLI and the wireless commu-
nications have not been considered in existing works. Actually,
while RFFs from severe hardware imperfections or hostile
multipath channel effects can deteriorate the communication
performance, the communication protocols (e.g., modulation
scheme) and wireless regulations (e.g., spectrum mask) can
also heavily influence the WPLI.
To address the concern on the reliability and differentia-
bility of RFFs, the modeling and evaluation of the existing
WPLI solutions under the influence of the above real-world
limitations is of great importance. However, the research
in this field is still very limited. There is still no clear
answer on whether existing WPLI techniques can fulfill the
above five criteria. In [4] and [7], the RF-front-end-based
RFF is modeled as nonlinear distortions at the transmitter.
Then a hypothesis test-based theoretical model is provided to
evaluate the identification accuracy. However, the impacts of
receiver device and the wireless channel are not considered.
Moreover, while the model provides simple and neat theoret-
ical prediction, it cannot capture the effects of the complex
procedures in signal processing procedure of the wireless
communication and the fingerprint extraction/match. In [18],
the influence of the low-end wireless receiver is evaluated
through experiments. However, this experiment-based work
is limited to one type of devices in one channel, which
lacks the universal insights. Similarly, in [13], the stability
of the identification accuracy is investigated by experiments
in the wireless channel with varied distances and antenna
polarizations. The specific-channel experiments also lack the
applicability to other wireless environments. All the above
evaluation research only focus on specific components in
a specific WPLI technique used in a specific environment.
To our best knowledge, there is no work that provides a
systematic understanding and quantitatively evaluation of the
whole WPLI procedure under the aforementioned real-world
limitations.
In this paper, through a comprehensive theoretical model
and a series of experiments, we rigorously evaluate the reli-
ability and differentiability of WPLI techniques according to
the aforementioned five criteria. First, we develop a WPLI
model that provides a systematic and mathematic description
of the whole WPLI procedure. More importantly, we then
implement the developed model in various WPLI systems that
use the spectrum domain RFF due to the non-linear RF front-
end. The performance and limitations of that WPLI system
is quantitatively evaluated according to our five criteria in
different settings of receiver device, wireless channel, and
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communication protocol. We select the spectrum domain RFF
from non-linear RF front-end as the study case because it
has relatively low requirement of the receiver hardware while
gives very good reported performance . The influence of real-
world requirements and constraints are analyzed along each
step in the inter-coupled WPLI and wireless communications,
including (i) the modulation and filtering of digital signal at
the transmitter, (ii) the RFF stamping along the DAC, Mixer,
RF front-end amplifier, polarized antennas, and the wireless
channel, (iii) the signal propagation along complicated mul-
tipath channels with mobile users and obstructions, (iv) the
reception, demodulation, sampling of the RFF-stamped signal
at the receiver; and (v) the RFF extraction and classification
algorithms.
We conduct in-lab experiments to validate the developed
model and our findings. The off-the-shelf wireless devices
under investigation include MicaZ wireless sensor nodes[19]
and USRP software defined radio platforms [20], which oper-
ate at 2.48 GHz. The influence of multiple factors on WPLI
are tested, including the wireless multipath signal propagation,
the receiver sampling rate, and fingerprint database updating
strategy. We use the MicaZ sensors as the transmitter (device to
be identified) and USRP as the receiver (identifier), which are
deployed in several specially designed indoor multipath fading
channels. Due to the reconfigurability of the USRPs, various
receiver sampling rates as well as other receiver processing
parameters can be changed in real time to highlight the certain
influence.
Through the theoretical modeling and experimental valida-
tion, we reveal the limitations of existing WPLI techniques.
We find the major challenge comes from the complex and
dynamic wireless mobile channel. It is less possible in both
theory and real world that the existing WPLI technique can
achieve acceptable accuracy in a long distance, non-line-of-
sight, fading channel with mobile users and obstructions.
Moreover, the more strict physical layer communication pro-
tocols (e.g, GSM compared with 802.15) may cause deteriora-
tions of WPLI accuracy, which is due to the regulation of the
spectrum mask. In terms of receiver device requirement, higher
sampling rate can help increase the identification performance
if the noise level is low and the transmitter stamps significant
RFFs in wide spectrum. Otherwise, higher sampling rate does
not help in reducing error rate due to the accumulation of noise
over wider spectrum.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. The
theoretical model is developed to characterize the complete
WPLI procedure in Section II. Then, in Section III, the
limitations of WPLI are analyzed in details by implementing
the theoretical model in various WPLI systems where the RFFs
come from the RF-front-end non-linearity. Next, we further
validate and discuss our findings by experiments in Section
IV. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section V.
II. Theoretical Model of WPLI
As the WPLI is closely coupled with wireless communi-
cations, the theoretical model of WPLI is also based on the
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Fig. 2. WPLI procedure along wireless communication flow block diagram.
wireless communication procedure, as shown in Fig. 2. This
section provide general but rigorous mathematical descriptions
of the whole WPLI procedure shown in Fig. 2, including four
major segments: the signal processing and RFF stamping at
the transmitter, the signal propagation along wireless channels,
the signal reception and feature extraction at the receiver, and
the final identification and classification.
A. Signal Processing and RFF Stamping at Transmitter
At beginning of the signal processing at the transmitter, the
data source send binary bits sequence to the digital modulation
block, where the sequential binary bits are first mapped to
higher order and complex transmit symbols . We use m to
index the sequence of the transmitted symbols so that each
symbol is denoted as xm = xIm + jx
Q
m, where xIm and x
Q
m are
the in-phase and quadrature components, respectively. The
duration of each symbol is determined by the expected data
rate and the order of modulation scheme, which is denoted
as Tsymbol. Ideally, Tsymbol should be a constant in one packet
transmission. However, due to the clock-related hardware im-
perfection, the period/duration of each symbol can vary. As a
result, the first possible RFF due to the hardware imperfection
appears, which is regarded as a unique time domain feature
and is defined as time interval error (TIE) [2]. We denote this
feature as σmT IE at the m
th symbol. Hence, the real symbol
duration of the mth symbol becomes Tm = T + σmT IE .
After that the complex symbols xm is processed by the shap-
ing filter hs(t,Tm), which gives the output bmod(xm, hs(t,Tm)),
where the formulation of the function bmod(·) is determined
by the specific modulation scheme (we will discuss several
examples in Section III). Then the digital signal moves to
the digital-to-analog converter (DAC). It should be noted that
bmod(xm, hs(t,Tm)) is in fact a desecrate function as the digital
shaping filter hs(t) only change value when the DAC generate
new output. We consider that the DAC has a generation period
Tg, i.e., the DAC converts the value of bmod(xm, hs(t,Tm)) to
analog current every Tg second. Then the input digital signal
u[n] (indexed by n) at the DAC can be expressed as
u[n] = A
∑
m
bmod(xm, hs(nTg − mTm,Tm)), (1)
where A is the amplitude coefficient. It should be noted that
the clock-related hardware imperfection could also influence
the DAC generation period Tg. However, since Tg is much
smaller than Tm (due to the high DAC sampling rate), the
TIE in Tg is much less significant and can be neglected. It is
also worth mentioning that any specific wireless protocol (e.g.,
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802.11, 802.15, GSM/GPRS, etc.) defines particular modula-
tion schemes and shaping filter, which prepare the transmitted
signal with different bandwidth and power spectrum density
(PSD). Those parameters can dramatically influence the signif-
icance of RFF and eventually affect the performance of WPLI.
Detailed examples are discussed in Section III and IV.
Ideally the DAC converts the baseband signal sequence
u[n] to a time-continuous analog signal u(t). However, the
real output signal yu(t) from practical DAC is combed with
quantization error and integral nonlinearity (INL) [21], which
can be expressed as
yu(t) =
∞∑
n=−∞
(u(n) + ∆n)g(
t − nTg
Tg
) + ∆INL,
g(θ) =
1, 0 ≤ θ < 10, elsewhere (2)
where ∆n is quantization noise, for M-bit DAC quantization
with input signal dynamic range [−U, U], the maximum
quantization error δ∆ = 2−MU; ∆INL is the integral nonlinearity
that is also regarded as a unique feature rooted in hardware
imperfection in [4].
After the DAC, the analog baseband signal is moved to
passband by the mixer. Ideally the complex passband signal
z(t) consists the in-phase component i(t) · cos(ωct) and the
quadrature component jq(t) · sin(ωct), where ωc is the car-
rier angle frequency and i(t) = Re{yu(t)}, q(t) = Im{yu(t)}.
However, in practical, the phase offset quadrature error occurs
in this procedure due to the imperfection of transmitter’s
frequency synthesizers (local oscillators), which modifies z(t)
to
z(t) =
1
2
(Re{yu(t)} · e jζ/2 + Im{yu(t)} · e− jζ/2) · e jωct (3)
+
1
2
(Re{yu(t)} · e jζ/2 − Im{yu(t)} · e− jζ/2) · e− jωct
where ζ is the quadrature error. In [6] and [5], the uniqueness
of the mixer quadrature error is utilized as RFFs.
Finally, the passband signals go through the TX front-end
amplifier and filter to gain enough power for radiation. In this
procedure, another important RFF is stamped, i.e., the non-
linearity of the front-end amplifier [22], which is widely used
in many recent WPLI techniques [22], [4], [7], [8]. The output
signal can be formulated as
w(t) = hPA(z(t), a˜tx) ⊗ hBP(t)
HBP( f ) =
1, | f | < Wc0, | f | > Wc (4)
where hPA(·, a˜tx) is nonlinear function of power amplifier at the
transmitter (detailed examples are given in Section III); a˜tx
is complex complex power-series, ⊗ stands for convolution
computing; and hBP(t) is the bandpass filter function that is
nearly ideal within the carrier bandwidth Wc.
B. Signal Propagation between TX and RX Antennas along
Wireless Channel
We consider the antennas as part of the wireless channel
since both the antenna polarization and the multipath channel
can be used as RFFs in WPLI. With the input signal w(t)
given in (II-A), the intensity of the radiated EM waves by a
polarized antenna is given by
~Atx(t) = Fhtx[w(t)] · e− jφ
h
tx · ~ρh + Fvtx[w(t)] · e− jφ
v
tx · ~ρv (5)
where ~ρh and ~ρv are the direction unit vectors in the horizontal
and vertical directions, respectively; Fhtx(·) and Fvtx(·) are the
TX antenna projection functions that project the input signal
w(t) to the horizontal and vertical polarization, respectively;
φhtx and φtx are the polarization phases at both directions. In
some specific wireless system, such as RFID using the spiral
coil antenna, the imperfection of antenna hardware can also
contribute to the RFF in WPLI [9]. Moreover, even for the sim-
pler antennas that are widely used in contemporary wireless
devices (e.g., dipole antennas and patch antennas), although
the RFF does not come from antenna imperfection, the random
direction of antenna can generate random polarization. Then
the antenna polarization can either influence the RFFs due to
other hardwares [13] or act as a new RFF (coupled with the
multipath effect) [11], [12].
The radiated EM waves then propagate through the mul-
tipath wireless channel and finally reach the RX antenna at
the receiver. As the RX antenna can be also polarized, the
intensity of the EM waves at the RX antenna is also presented
in both horizontal and vertical direction:
~Arx(t) =
Np∑
i=1
~Atx(t) · (hhi · ~ρh + hvi · ~ρv) ⊗ δ(t − τi) (6)
where we consider there are Np paths (including line-of-
sight, reflected, diffracted, and refracted paths) connecting the
transmitter and receiver; hhi and h
V
i are the path loss of the
ithpath with horizontal polarized waves and vertical polarized
waves, respectively; τi is the propagation delay of the ithpath.
It is obvious that the complex multipath wireless channel
can arbitrarily change the amplitude, the delay, the phase of
the EM waves at each single path. Consequently, the wireless
channel can literally mask most, if not all, RFFs stamped
at the transmitter. Hence, the channel effects on WPLI need
special attention in the performance evaluation. In [13], [1],
it has been proved that the WPLI accuracy decreases as the
distance between the transmitter and receiver increases. It
should be noted that the channels considered in [13], [1] are
still friendly, which is open space without significant multipath
and obstructions. The practical wireless channel, especially in
real indoor or metropolitan environments, could be much more
hostile in keeping the RFFs from the transmitter. We will do
case studies in various multipath channels in the following
sections.
It should be also noted that another branch of WPLI systems
uses the multipath channel characteristics to authenticate the
transmitter (mainly it’s location) [11], [12]. The obvious draw-
back is that such system only works when the transmitter and
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receiver are fixed and there should be no mobile obstructions
in the environment that can change the channel characteristics.
However, those conditions are not feasible in most current
wireless applications. Hence, we do not further discuss the
evaluation of the WPLI systems in this branch.
C. Signal Reception and Processing at Receiver
At the receiver, the RX antenna captures the EM waves
(given in (6)) and convert both the horizontal and vertical
polarized components to the received signal:
r(t) = Fhrx
−1
[~Arx(t) · ~ρh · e jφhrx ] + Fvrx−1[~Arx(t) · ~ρv · e jφ
v
rx ]; (7)
where Fhrx(·)−1 and Fvrx(·)−1 are the RX antenna functions
that capture the horizontal and vertical EM wave components,
respectively; φhrx and φrx are the polarization phases of the RX
antenna.
Similar as the transmitter, the received signal also need to
pass through the RF front-end at the receiver:
f (t) = hPA(r(t) ⊗ hBP(t), a˜rx) (8)
where hPA(·, a˜rx) is nonlinear function of power amplifier at
the receiver; and hBP(t) is the bandpass filter at the receiver,
all similar to the case at the transmitter.
Then the output signal from the RX front-end is convert
to baseband by the receiver mixer with quadrature errors
(i.e., carrier demodulation). The demodulation signal then goes
through the low pass filter hLP(t) to eliminate the higher
frequency components, which gives the results of
x(t) =
1
2
(Re{ f (t)} · e jζ/2 + Im{ f (t)} · e− jζ/2) · e jωct ⊗ hLP(t) (9)
+
1
2
(Re{ f (t)} · e jζ/2 − Im{ f (t)} · e− jζ/2) · e− jωct ⊗ hLP(t)
Note that the low pass filter at the receiver always have a
strict cutoff to control the noise level. The gains of the pass-
band and stop-band can significantly affect the extracted RFFs,
especially the spectrum-domain RFFs. The low pass filter
function hLP(t) can be modeled as
HLP( f ) =
Ap, | f | < WAs, | f | > W (10)
where Ap and As are the gains in the pass-band and stop-band,
respectively.
Finally, the received baseband signals x(t) are sampled by
analog-to-digital converter (ADC) to obtain the digital signal
sequences which are sent to the identification units to extract
the fingerprints. The ADC output is expressed as
x[n] = x(nTs) + ∆n (11)
where ∆n is random quantization noise, for M-bit ADC
quantization and input dynamic range [−V, V], the maximum
quantization error is δ∆ = 2−MV . As discussed in Section I,
most existing WPLI solutions utilize the high-end measure-
ment equipment (e.g., oscilloscope and spectrum analyzer)
as the receiver. The key difference between the real wireless
receivers lies in the sampling rate. While the oscilloscope and
spectrum analyzer can directly sample the passband (or the
baseband) signal at sampling rate in the order of GHz, most
practical wireless device can only sample the baseband signal
at the MHz rate. Hence, in the following sections, we will
quantitatively analyze the important influence of the receiver’s
sampling rate.
It should be noted that the above signal reception and
processing procedures are also subject to the influence of the
hardware imperfections at the receiver’s antenna, front end,
mixer, and ADC. However, those hardware imperfections are
known to the receiver (or the identifier). Hence, the deviation
or errors introduced by those hardware imperfections at the
receiver can be adjusted and corrected when RFF is extracted.
D. RFF Extraction, Identification, and Classification
At the identification unit of the receiver, the RFFs are
extracted from the sampled digital signals1 (x[n] in (11)). The
extracted feature can be expressed as
S = Feature({x[n], n ∈ N}) (12)
where N is the set of all sampled digital signals in this round
of identification; Feature(·) is the feature extraction function.
Depending on the properties of the RFF and the selected
extraction strategy, the feature extraction function Feature(·)
usually consists of domain change (e.g., Fourier transform,
Wavelet transform, Hilbert transform, among others) and
dimensionality reduction (e.g., linear discriminant analysis
(LDA), principal component analysis (PCA), or simply picking
us a certain parameter such as modulation errors and phase
errors ).
By now, the RFF S is obtained. The next step is to match the
RFF with the reference fingerprint, SR to calculate the distance
matching scores and make the classification or identification
decisions. The performance of the classification/identification
can be evaluated by the error probabilities, which can be
theoretically calculated through hypothesis testing models.
1) Classification: For N-users classification scenario, we
adopt N-hypothesis testing techniques to apply to N genuine
users with MN reference fingerprints in the database for each
user [23]. The hypothesis HN is that the obtained signal is
from the genuine user #N. Then the classification probability
can be expressed by P(Hi|H j), i, j = 1, ..., N, i , j, which is
the probability that the RFF from genuine user # j is classified
as the genuine user #i. Such probability can be derived based
on the feature distance between the extracted testing feature
vector S with the reference feature vector SR:
Di(S) = Distance(S,SR) (13)
The testing feature vector S is matched with all the reference
fingerprints and assigned to the identity with the smallest
distance score. Then the classification error probability can
be expressed as
P(Hi|H j) = P(Di = min({D})|H j); (14)
1The exception is the RFFs residing in the passband turn-on/off transient,
which is digital sampled and extracted right after the RX front-end. Our model
can be easily adjust to describe such case by deleting the signal processing
of mixer.
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where the formulation of the probability P(Di = min({D})|H j)
depends on the distribution of Di(S), which is discussed in
detail in Section III. Then the average classification error rate
can be derived:
Pe =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1, j,i
P(H j|Hi)P(Hi) (15)
2) Identification: Unlike the N-users classification, in the
identification procedure, the distance scores between each
authorized class is not the key metric. The whole network
can be considered as a two-user hypothesis model [13], [4],
[7]. H1 is the hypothesis that the incoming testing fingerprint
is from the genuine users while H0 indicates that the testing
fingerprint is from an unknown imposter. In another word, all
the N genuine users that have reference fingerprints stored in
database can be treated as a whole class. A decision threshold
λ is set up based on the calculated feature distance in (29).
If the minimal distance score is larger than the threshold, the
testing feature is identified as an imposter’s fingerprint, i.e.,
H0, otherwise it is judged as from a genuine user H1, i.e.,
min({D}) H0≷
H1
λ. (16)
To evaluate the accuracy of identification performance,
several probability metrics can be applied [9], [13], including
false accept rate (FAR) P(H1|H0), false reject rate (FRR)
P(H0|H1), genuine accept rate (GAR) P(H1|H1), and genuine
reject rate (GRR) P(H0|H0). Based on the decision rule given
in (16), the above probabilities can be calculated in the same
way as the classification case according to (13) and (14). We
don’t further elaborate the similar formulas here. To generate
a single probability metric in identification system, many work
put the above error rates together in the Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC) chart where the FRRs (or GARs) are
plotted as a function of different FAR levels. The operating
point in ROC, where FAR and FRR are equal, is referred to
as the equal error rate (EER).
III. Real-world Constrains and Requirements: Analysis
by Implementing the WPLI Model
In this section, we implement the developed WPLI model
in a promising and widely adopted WPLI technique [16],
[13], [9], [2], i.e., the WPLI using frequency domain RFF
that originates from the non-linearity of the TX front-end
amplifier. The real-world requirements and constraints of the
key procedures in WPLI are analyzed. It should be noted that,
in this section, the RFF only come from the non-linear RF
front-end. While other hardware imperfections still exist, they
are considered as the hardware noises on top of ideal circuits.
A. Modulation and Shaping Filter: Constraints of Communi-
cation Protocols and Regulation
Preparing the transmitted signal through modulation and
shaping filter are the first steps in the WPLI procedure in
Fig. 2. In fact, the modulation and shaping filter are de-
termined by the specific communication protocol to achieve
the expected data rate and to keep the signal power staying
within the assigned spectrum band (not interfere other wireless
services). The RFF has to be stamped on the resulted signal.
Hence, the regulated modulation and shaping filter become the
first constraints on WPLI. As mentioned in (1), the function
bmod(·) is determined by the specific modulation scheme and
shaping filter. Here we implement two widely used modulation
schemes: M-PSK and M-QAM. The modulation functions
bmod(·) in (1) for M-PSK can be further expressed as
bPS K(xm, hs(t)) = exp{ j piM xm}hs(t), (17)
where M is the modulation order. For M-QAM,
bQAM(xm, hs(t)) = xmhs(t), (18)
Similarly, we implement two widely used shaping filters,
including the half-sine (HS) and root-raised-cosine (RRC)
filters. The HS shaping is utilized in IEEE 802.15.4 protocols
and the RRC is used in GSM cellular systems. The shaping
filter function hs(t,Tm) in (1) can be further expressed as
hs,HS (t,Tm) = sin(pi
t
2Tm
) (19)
hs,RRC(t,Tm) = 4β
cos((1+β)pit/Tm)+sin((1−β)pit/Tm)/(4βt/Tm)
pi
√
Tm(1−(4βt/Tm)2) (20)
0 < t < 2Tm,
where Tm is the duration of the mth symbol and β is the
rolloff factor of RRC shaping filter. After the implementing
the specific modulation scheme and shaping filter, the output
passband signal z(t) after the processing of the DAC and
mixer along WPLI procedure in Fig. 2 can be analytically
characterized. The power spectrum density (PSD) of z(t)
using different modulation schemes and shaping filters can be
numerically derived. We leave the conclusion of the influence
of modulation scheme and shaping filter on RFFs to the next
subsection where the RFF (i.e., the front-end non-linearity in
this WPLI system) is added to the passband signal.
B. RF Front-end Non-linearity: Significance of Selected RFF
According to Fig. 2, the passband signal z(t) is amplified
to gain enough radiation power at the RF front-end, where
the RFF considered in this section is added to the signal. The
RFF is due to the nonlinear distortion and regrowth of the
spectrum at the transmitter RF front-end amplifier, which can
be characterized by a complex power-series behavioral model
[24]. The spectrum of output signal of the RF front-end can
be modeled as
S FE( f ) =H(z, a˜tx) =
(N−1)
2∑
n=0
(N−1)
2∑
m=0
a˜2n+1a˜∗2m+1
22(n+m)
×
(
2n + 1
n + 1
) (
2m + 1
m + 1
)
S˜ (2n+1)(2m+1)( f ); (21)
where S FE( f ) is the output signal spectrum after the front-end;
a˜tx = {a˜n} is the set of the unique coefficients of the non-linear
system; S˜ (2n+1)(2m+1)( f ) is the N th odd order autocorrelation
spectrum of z(t); z(t) is the input passband signal; and ∗
denotes the conjugate signal. The function S˜ (2n+1)(2m+1)( f ) is
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Fig. 3. PSDs of signals (a) using OQPSK and Half-sine Shaping (USRP). (b)
using OQPSK and RRC Shaping (USRP). (c) using 8PSK and RRC Shaping
(USRP). (d) using 16QAM and RRC Shaping (USRP). (e) using OQPSK and
Half-sine Shaping (MicaZ).
given by
S˜ (2n+1)(2m+1)( f ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
<z˜2n+1 z˜2m+1 (τ)e− jωτdτ,
where
<z˜2n+1 z˜2m+1 (τ) = limT→∞
∫ T
−T
z˜n+11 (z˜
∗
1)
nz˜m1 (z˜
∗
2)
m+1dt,
z˜1 = z(t), z˜2 = z(t + τ), ...
Each non-linear RF front-end has a unique set a˜tx that consti-
tutes the foundation of the RFF. In the theoretical modeling
in this paper, we derive the coefficient set a˜tx by fitting the
measured spectrum of the output signal of real wireless devices
(MicaZ sensor nodes [19] and USRP software defined radio
platform [20]). Note that the antennas in MicaZ sensors and
USRPs are simple vertical polarized antennas. Hence, they
can be considered as ideal single polarized antennas without
obvious imperfection. Hence, the antenna output ~Atx(t) in (5)
becomes a linear function of the RF front-end output w(t). This
fact justify why we can directly use the measured spectrum of
the output signal of the MicaZ sensors and USRPs to derive
the unique coefficient set a˜tx.
Now we can numerically check the significance of the
selected RFF as well as the influence of modulation scheme
and shaping filter. Fig. 3(a) - Fig. 3(d) show the PSDs of the
transmitted wireless signal at the TX side with and without
the RFF (front-end non-linearity), using different modulation
schemes and shaping filters. The PSD without RFF is derived
by our model with the ideal RF front-end. To derive the
PSD with RFF, two non-linear system coefficient sets (a˜tx)
are derived based on the measurements from two USRP
transmitters, which have the carrier frequency fc = 2.48GHz
(IEEE 802.15.4) and the fixed baseband data rate Rb = 2Mbps.
Fig. 3(a) shows the PSDs using OQPSK modulation and
half-sine shaping filter. The PSDs with RFF are signifi-
cantly different from the PSD without RFF. Moreover, the
RFF-stamped PSDs of different devices also show obvious
uniqueness, which confirms the effectiveness of the selected
RFF (at least at the TX side before wireless channel). More
importantly, we observe that RFF become more significant as
the signal spectrum moves away from the carrier frequency.
In another word, RFF is mainly added to the higher frequency
segment of the baseband signal.
In Fig. 3(b), the shaping filter is changed from half-sine to
RRC. We can see that the half-sine shaping filter can result in
a spectrum with more side lobes and larger bandwidth, while
the RRC shaping filter strictly restrains the bandwidth and
eliminates the leakage and harmonics of the side lobes. From
the perspective of the communication regulation, RRC shaping
filter definitely performs better in terms of eliminating the
interference to other wireless service in the adjacent frequency
band. However, since the RFF considered in this paper shows
more uniqueness in the spectrum side lobes, the RRC also
reduce the effectiveness of the RFF.
Similar effects are shown in different modulation schemes.
Fig. 3(b) and Fig. 3(d) compare the PSDs using 8PSK
and 16QAM modulation schemes. As the modulation order
increases, the signal power is more restricted in the mail
lobes and the RFF uniqueness is only observable in the small
bandwidth of the main lobes.
Besides the USRPs, we also take the non-linear system
coefficient sets (a˜tx) from the measurements of two MicaZ
sensors (OQPSK modulation and half-sine shaping filter),
which show more obvious nonlinear distortions. In Fig. 3(e),
the PSDs of the two sensors are shown companying with
the ideal signal without fingerprinting distortions. The results
confirm that the RFFs due to non-linear front-end amplifier
are more significant in the side lobes of the signal spectrum.
C. Wireless Multipath Channel: Impact of Practical Environ-
ments
As discussed in Section II-B, the complex multipath chan-
nel can dramatically change the effectiveness of RFFs from
the transmitter. While the ray-tracing model given in (6) is
very accurate, it lacks the theoretical insights and cannot be
further abstracted. Hence, in this subsection, we utilize the
widely used statistical multipath channel models, including the
AWGN channel, Rayleigh channel, Rician channel, and Nak-
agami channel, to analyze the channel impacts. The Rayleigh
model is frequently used to model multipath fading with
no direct line-of-sight path. The Rician model is often used
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Fig. 4. (a) PSDs of RFF-stamped signals at different distance. (b) PSDs of
RFF-stamped signals from two devices at 6 m.
when there is one strong direct line-of-sight component and
many random weaker components. The Nakagami-m model
gives the best fit to land mobile and indoor-mobile multipath
propagation. As the parameter m increases to infinite, the
Nakagami-m channel converges to a AWGN channel. We
consider the signal bandwidth is smaller than the channel
coherent bandwidth [25]. As a result, the channel effects on
spectrum fingerprints can be considered as a flat spectrum
amplitude fading, which consists of a large scale path loss αpl
and small scale multipath fading αch [26]. Then the intensity
of the EM waves at the RX antenna can be simplified as
~Arx(t) = ~Atx(t) · αpl · αch + NAWGN (22)
where NAWGN is the channel background noise; the large scale
path loss αpl in logarithm scale at distance d is given by
αpl[dB] = αpl(d0) − 10η · log( dd0 ) (23)
where αpl(d0) is the path loss at the reference distance d0, η
is the path loss exponent, Xσ is a normal random variable.
For the small scale channel effects, while the AWGN chan-
nel simply has the αch = 1, the probability density function
(PDF) of αch in Rayleigh, Rican, and Nakagami-m channel
are [25]:
pRay(α) =
2α
Ω
exp(−α
2
Ω
) (24)
pNak(α) =
2mmα2m−1
ΩmΓ(m)
exp(−mα
2
Ω
)
pRic(α) =
2(1 + n2)e−n2α
Ω
exp
[
− (1 + n
2)α2
Ω
]
I0
2nα
√
1 + n2
Ω

where α is channel fading amplitude with mean-square Ω =
α¯2; m is the Nakagami-m fading parameters which ranges from
1
2 to ∞; where n is the Nakagami-n fading parameter is related
to the Rician K factor by K = n2; I0(·) is the zeroth-order
modified Bessel function of the first kind.
By applying the above channel effects on the PSDs of
the radiated signal at the transmitter, Fig. 4(a) show how
the signal PSD changes along a Rayleigh multipath channel.
The red curve is the signal PSD at 0.1m away from the
transmitter while the blue curve is the PSD 6m away from
the transmitter. A very significant distortion can be observed
due to the wireless channel effect. Fig. 4(b) shows the PSDs
of the two MicaZ sensors 6m away from the transmitters.
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Fig. 6. FFT PSDs (8Ms/s) with different number of FFT points.
Compared with the PSD of the same sensors in Fig. 3(e)
when the distance is 0m, we find that the side lobes of the
PSDs (where the most identity information resides) are mostly
ruined by channel effects. That is the reason why most WPLI
systems need to update the identifiers’ fingerprint database and
threshold whenever the user moves or the channel condition
changes. It also explains why the WPLI performance are poor
over the multipath channel.
D. Sampling and FFT: Influence of Receiver Device
As modeled in Section II-C, the receiver captures/processes
the wireless signal and finally derives the sampled digital
signals {x[n]}. Since the WPLI technique considered in this
section requires the frequency domain feature, the fast Fourier
transform (FFT) is applied to the sampled digital signals,
which is actually part of the feature extraction modeled in
(12). The output of the NFFT -points FFT transformation is:
X[k] =
NFFT−1∑
n=0
x[n] · e−2piikn/NFFT (25)
where fs = 1/Ts is the ADC sampling rate. The ADC sampling
rate fs as well as the bandwidth of the LPF in (10) determine
the bandwidth of the FFT spectrum. The FFT point number
NFFT controls the frequency domain resolution. According to
the FFT properties, NFFT ≥ L, where L is the length of the
sampled signal. In most WPLI systems, NFFT is fixed to the
length of the tested data (e.g., the signal preamble [16]).
The effects of different receiver sampling rates are illustrated
in Fig. 5, where the FFT spectrum from one of the MicaZ
sensors in Fig. 4(b) are plotted with two different sampling
rates. We observe that the higher sampling rate keeps more
RFF identification information that mainly resides in the side
lobes of the signal PSD. However, it should be also noted that
the high sampling rate may also increase the noise band. If
the SNR become very low in a long distance fading channel,
8
the high sampling rate may not be a favorable option. Existing
work keeps SNR high when the high-end measurement equip-
ments are used. In the Fig. 6, the FFT PSDs of the same signal
with different FFT points are shown. It is clear that the higher
FFT point number increases the frequency domain resolution.
However, we don’t find clear relationships between the higher
FFT resolution with the better identification performance. Part
of the reason is that we always keep NFFT larger than the
length of sampled signal in time domain.
E. Error Rate in Classification & Identification: Final Metrics
Although the above analysis gives qualitative explanation on
the real-world constraints and requirements of WPLI systems,
the quantitative evaluation needs the error rates in classification
or identification as the final metrics, which is theoretically
derived in this subsection. Before calculating the error rates,
the RFF needs to be extracted and compared with the reference
RFFs.
1) Fingerprint Extraction: As discussed at the beginning
of this section, the only RFF considered in this WPLI system
is the TX RF front-end non-linearity. The other hardware
imperfections are considered as additional noises on top of
ideal circuit while the multipath channel effects are considered
as random process defined by the statistical channel models.
Hence, we can rewrite the FFT result of the sampled digital
signal X[k] as a function of the TX baseband signal u(t):
X = αpl · αch · U˜ ·Htx ·HTrx + N; (26)
where X is the vector {X[k], k = 1, 2, ...}; the channel effect
is represented by the path loss αpl, the fading αch, and the
background noise (part of N), as modeled in (22); the RF
front-end non-linearity at transmitter is characterized by Htx,
which is determined by the a unique coefficient set a˜tx = {an}
of the non-linear system at the TX RF front-end described in
(21), in particular:
Htx =
[
|a˜1|2 ... a˜2n+1a˜
∗
2m+1
22(n+m)
2n + 1n + 1

2m + 1m + 1

]T
.
Similarly, Hrx in (III-E1) describes the non-linearity at the
receiver front-end but is considered as a known vector by
the identifier. The receiver can cancel the effect of the non-
linearity at the receiver front-end before the identification
or classification. The influences of all the other hardware
imperfections (clock circuit, DAC, and mixer) contribute to
the other part of the addictive noise N. In (III-E1), the TX
baseband signal input is represented by a diagonal matrix U˜:
U˜ = Diag
{
U˜11 ... U˜2n+1,2m+1
}
;
where U˜2n+1,2m+1 has the same formulation as the passband
autocorrelation spectrum S˜ (2n+1)(2m+1) given in (21); the only
difference is that the passband input z(t) is replaced with the
baseband input u(t).
After canceling the known influence of the RX front-
end non-linearity, the sampled digital signal X become the
fingerprint at the receiver S:
S = X ·HTrx−1 = αpl · αch · U˜ ·Htx + N˜ (27)
We approximately modeled N˜ as a Gaussian noise since many
independent sources jointly contribute to it.
The reference fingerprints of the authorized users in the
database at the identifier SR can be expressed by
SR = αpl,R · αch,R · U˜ ·Htx,R; (28)
where αpl,R and αch,R usually do not take effect since the
reference fingerprints are obtained when the transmitter is very
close to the receiver; all reference and device to be identified
use the same transmitted signal packet so that they share the
same known U˜; and Htx,R is the source of the fingerprints of
the reference.
2) Fingerprint Matching: There are multiple ways to cal-
culate the distance between the testing fingerprint S with
the reference fingerprint SR. The most straightforward way is
to calculate the norm of the difference of the two vectors,
i.e., D(S) = ||S − SR||. However, this method treats the
difference of each frequency point equally and adds them
together. In contrast, as we show in Fig. 3(a)-Fig. 3(e), the
uniqueness of the RFFs shows more significant difference at
the higher frequency range of the baseband signal. Hence, a
more efficient way is to assign higher weight to the frequency
points where the uniqueness of the RFFs is more obvious.
To this end, the Linear Discriminant Analyses (LDA) strategy
is introduced [27], [13], which assigns different weights to
different frequency points according to the information from
fingerprint database.
Consistency with the previous discussion, the covered band-
width of the extracted fingerprint vector is determined by
the receiver sampling rate, i.e., BW = fs/2. The length of
the fingerprint vector is determined by the FFT points i.e.
LN = NFFT . The prerequisite of effective LDA is that the
receiver sampling rate is high enough to keep the majority
of the fingerprint information and the FFT point number is
larger than the data/preamble length. Under the LDA scheme,
the feature distance Di(S) between the incoming feature vector
S and the ith reference feature vector SiR is given by [27]:
Di(S) =
∥∥∥∥WTLDA · (S − SiR)∥∥∥∥
σ
(
WTLDA · SiR
) ; (29)
where WLDA is the LDA feature matrix that is derived based on
the fingerprint database of the authorized users; (·)T indicate
the matrix transpose; σ(·) is the standard deviation function
of a vector. We do not elaborate the procedures in training the
LDA feature matrix. Detailed formulas can be found in [27].
3) Classification Error Rate: In device classification, the
testing feature vector S is matched to all the reference fin-
gerprints {SiR, i = 1, 2, ...} and assigned to the identity with
the smallest distance score. Then the classification decision
probability P(Hi|H j) can be calculated according to (14).
Without loss of generality, we consider a two-user scenario
to derive the classification probabilities.
The two class classification scenario is between two genuine
user, H1 and H2. The feature distance from the incoming
vector to the two reference vectors are D1 and D2. Then the
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Fig. 7. Classification error rates over different channels. (a) with updated
database. (b) with fixed database.
classification devision rule becomes D∆
de f
= D1−D2
H2
≷
H1
0. Then
the average classification error rate can be derived:
Pe = P(D∆ > 0|H1)P(H1) + P(D∆ < 0|H2)P(H2); (30)
where we can safely assume P(H1) = P(H2) = 0.5; and
P(D∆ > 0|H1) =
∫ S2R
σ
G2R
S1R−σG1R
S2R
σ
G2R
−σ
G1R
‖W‖(σG2R − σG1R )
σG1RσG2R
p(S|H1)dS.
(31)
Note that P(D∆ < 0|H2) can be derived in the same way.
In order to compute p(S|Hi), we define L de f= αplαch · U˜ ·Htx
so that S = L + N˜ according to (27). Then, the conditional
probability density p(S|Hi) can be derived by
p(S|Hi) =
∫ +∞
−∞
pL(x|Hi)pN˜(S − x)dx; (32)
where pN˜ is the probability density of a zero-mean Gaussian
variable with a predetermined variance; pL(x|Hi) is determined
by the statistical channel models given in (24):
pRayL (L|Hi) =
2‖(α−1pl U˜−1LHitx
−1)‖
Ω
· e−
(‖α−1pl U˜−1LHitx
−1‖)2
Ω (33)
pNakL (L|Hi) =
2mm(‖α−1pl U˜−1LHitx
−1‖)2m−1
ΩmΓ(m)
· e−
m(‖α−1pl U˜−1LHitx
−1‖)2
Ω
pRicL (L|Hi) =
2(1+n2)e−n2 (‖α−1pl U˜−1LH2tx
−1‖)
Ω
·e−
(1+n2)(‖α−1pl U˜−1LHitx
−1‖)2
Ω
· I0
2n(‖α−1pl U˜−1LHitx−1‖)
√
1 + n2
Ω

Note that the AWGN channel does not have multipath fading.
Hence, S becomes a Gaussian variable with the same variance
but different mean values, whose condition probability can be
easily derived.
Based on (30)-(33), we can numerically evaluate the clas-
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Fig. 8. Classification error rates with different receiver sampling rates.
sification error rate in different channels (AWGN, Rayleigh,
Nakagami m = 3, Rician K = 4) and with different receiver
sampling rate (2M-8MHz). When different channel/distance is
considered, we need to first determine the strategy on how
to build the fingerprint database. On the one hand, in most
existing work [13], the fingerprint database is updated with
the new channel characteristics whenever the transmitter or
receiver change location. On the other hand, we believe the
frequent database update is not feasible in many wireless ap-
plications. Hence, we evaluate both strategies. Fig. 7(a) shows
the classification error rate of different channel as a function
of distance. The fingerprint database is updated at each point
along the curves. Even with this infeasible strategy, we observe
that the error rate increases dramatically if the transmission
distance increases or the multipath channel is involved. Due
to the lack of line-of-sight path, the Rayleigh channel gives the
worse performance while the more friendly AWGN channel
has the best performance. In Fig. 7(b), we fix the reference
fingerprint (measured at the very close distance, 0.1 m) and
plot error curves at different distances over different channels.
We observe very poor classification performance. The error
rate approach 50% (i.e., loss of classification capability) within
10 m in the Rayleigh channel.
Besides the channel effect, we also evaluate the influence
of the receiver sampling rate on the classification error rates.
In Fig. 8, the numerical results of average classification
rates due to different sampling rate are shown. To avoid the
multipath effects and also to show the trade off in sampling
rates, we calculate the numerical results at 1m and 6m un-
der AWGN channel. At the close distance, where the SNR
level of the channel is high (25dB), the classification error
rate decreases with the increasing of sampling rate. This is
because more side-lobe information of spectrum are covered
by the fingerprinting sampling bandwidth. At 6m distance, the
classification performance become worse in higher sampling
rate situation. The reason for this phenomena is that most side-
lobe information are ruined by increased noise band when the
channel SNR level is low (15dB). Hence the choice of the
sampling rate is the trade off between the different application
scenarios due to the analyses in the previous section.
4) Identification Error Rate: Different from the classifica-
tion, authorized user/imposter detection can be considered as
a two-user hypothesis model. Due to the lack of knowledge
on imposters’ fingerprints, we cannot know which frequency
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Fig. 9. Theoretical ROC curves over different
channels.
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Fig. 10. Genuine Accept Rate over different
channels (with fixed database).
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Fig. 11. Genuine Accept Rate over different
channels (with updated database).
point carries more significant identification information. As
a result, the LDA scheme assigns the same weights for all
frequency points of the feature vectors. Then the identification
simply relies on the direct difference between the incoming
feature vector and the reference vector d = S − S1R. As
previously defined, H1 denotes the authorized users while H0
denotes imposters. According to the decision rule in (16), the
judging threshold λ needs to be determined first by finding
the EER point in the ROC chart. In most existing work, λ is
updated whenever the fingerprint database of authorized users
is updated. However, we can also change the strategy by fixing
the database and threshold after the first update. The difference
between the incoming feature and the reference under H1 can
be deduced as
d|H1 = S1 − S1R (34)
= αpl,1 · αch,1 · U˜ ·H1tx + N˜ − αpl,1 · αch,1 · U˜ ·H1tx
= N˜.
Similarly,
d|H0 = S0 − SR (35)
= (αpl,0 · αch,0 · U˜ ·Hun − αpl,1 · αch,1 · U˜ ·H1tx) + N˜
where Hun is RF front-end series of the imposter (unknown
to identifier). According to (34) and (35), the identification
problem can be simplified as a signal detection problem:
H1 indicates that the difference vector d is a zero-mean
Gaussian noise; while H0 indicates that d is a signal under
the influence of the multipath fading channel and the Gaussian
noise. Then we can apply the classical energy detection model
[28] that detects unknown signal over fading channels. In
AWGN channels, the identification GRR can be calculated by
PAWGN(H0|H0) = Qu(
√
2γ,
√
λ), (36)
where Qu(..) is the generalized Marcum Q-function, γ is the
SNR of difference vector d over the Gaussian noise N˜; and λ is
the judging threshold. In Rayleigh channels, the identification
GRR is
P(H0|H0)Ray = e− λ2
µ−2∑
n=0
1
n!
(
λ
2
)2
(37)
+
(
1+γ
γ
)µ−1 [
e−
λ
2(1+γ) − e− λ2 e− λ2 ∑µ−2n=0 1n! λγ2(1+γ) ] ,
where µ is the time bandwidth product. And in Nakagami-m
channels, identification GRR is:
P(H0|H0)Nak = α
G1 + β µ−1∑
n=1
(λ/2)n
2(n!) 1
F1
(
m;n+1; λ2
γ
m+γ
)
where m is the Nakagami-m parameter; 1F1(...) is the confluent
hypergeometric function; α and G1 are parts of the equations
which can be find in the specific form in [28]. Finally, in
Rician channels, GRR is given by
P(H0|H0)Ric = Q

√
2Kγ
K + 1 + γ
,
√
λ(K + 1)
K + 1 + γ
 , (38)
where K is the Rician factor; Q(..) = Q1(..) is the first-order
Marcum Q-function.
For all the four types of channels (AWGN, Rayleigh,
Nakagami, and Rician), the FRR remains the same, which
is
P(H0|H1) =
Γ(µ, λ2 )
Γ(µ)
. (39)
where Γ(..) is the incomplete gamma function.
It should be noted that the GRRs and FRRs given in
(36)-(39) are all functions of the SNR γ. Here the SNR is
not the ratio of the total signal over noise but the ratio of
feature difference over noise. Since the feature of imposters
is unknown, higher receiver sampling rate can help increase
γ by involving more possible significant device differences in
a wider spectrum, if the overall noise level is low. However,
if the noise level is high, higher receiver sampling rate may
reduce γ and harm the identification performance.
Based on the derived model, we calculate the theoretical
error rate to evaluate the influence of the wireless channel
and receiver sampling rate. Similar to the settings in the
classifications, we derive the authorized user’s fingerprint and
judging threshold at a very close distance (0.1m). Fig. 9 shows
the ROC curves of different channel types at the distance
of 0.1 m. Then we choose the EER point (0.1%) on the
AWGN curve as the judging threshold. In Fig. 10, we fix the
threshold and reference fingerprints. The identification GARs
at different distance over different channels are plotted. We
observe that if the reference fingerprint and threshold are fixed,
the identification performance dramatically deteriorates as the
transmission distance increases or the multipath channel model
is applied. In contrast, Fig. 11 shows the identification GARs
when the reference database and judging threshold get updates
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Fig. 12. Equal Error Rates with different receiver sampling rates.
Fig. 13. Experimental setup.
at each plot point. Obvious performance improvements are
observed but the influence of longer transmission distance and
the multipath channel is still significant.
In Fig. 12, the numerical results of equal error rate due
to different sampling rate are shown. Similarly, we calculate
the numerical results at 1m and 6m under AWGN channel.
At the close distance, the equal error rate decreases with
the increasing of sampling rate. However, at longer distance,
the performance of identification become worse with the
increasing of sampling rate. Hence the choice of the sampling
rate is still a trade off for identification performance under
different application scenarios.
IV. Experimental Analysis
In this section, we experimentally validate the real-world
constraints of WPLI analyzed in Section III. The experimental
setup and scenarios are first described. Then the influence of
wireless channels, receiver sampling rates, and FFT points on
the identification and classification performance of WPLI are
analyzed through a series of experiments.
A. Experimental Setup and Scenarios
The experimental setup is illustrated in Fig. 13. The trans-
mitters (device to be identified) are 6 Micaz sensors nodes,
which is a IEEE 802.15.4 compliant RF transceiver with the
RF frequency band ranging from 2.4 to 2.48 GHz [19]. The
modulation scheme and shaping filter used in IEEE 802.15.4
protocol are fixed, which are O-QPSK with half-sine pulse
shaping filter [29]. The baseband transmitting symbol rate 1
M symbol per second. The data packet preamble is used to
extract the RFF, which has a length of 32 bits all-zero data
(128 symbols for either I/Q-phase signal after modulation and
spread spectrum procedure).
We use USRP N210 companied with SBX daughter board
[20] as the receiver (identifier). The SBX daughter board is a
RF front-end system with a carrier frequency range from 400
MHz to 4.4 GHz, which allows communication with Micaz
nodes at the 2.4 GHz band. The USRP N210 is equipped with
a dual 14-bit ADC operating at 100 MHz and dual 16-bit
DAC operating at 400 MHz. The data finally stored in files
are sampled with the setting sampling rate fs in GNU Radio
software platform. The maximum sampling rate is 25 Ms/s due
to limitation of direct gigabit Ethernet link [30]. It should be
noted that in the digital down conversion procedure to achieve
the setting sampling rate, the USRP utilizes a half-band filter
which is the low pass filter with pass bandwidth W = fs/2
[31].
The receiver is either 1 m, 3 m, or 6 m away from
the transmitters to obtain the large scale attenuation effects.
Meanwhile, the receiver is placed in the middle of a circle of
the metal obstacles (laptops), wooden obstacles (book shelfs),
and the concrete wall, as shown in Fig. 13. Hence, no direct
line-of-sight wireless link exists and obvious multipath effects
can be observed. In the experiments to validate the effects of
receiver sampling rates and FFT points, we place the receiver
in an in-door open space to build an AWGN-type channel so
that the receiver’s settings take major effects (other than the
multipath channel).
A laptop with MATLAB 2014b is connected to the USRP
receiver. The packet preambles are extracted from data files
obtained in USRP and the LDA-based identification and
classification algorithms are realized in MATLAB. To extract
the preambles from the data files, the variance-based threshold
detection algorithm [32] is adopted. The LDA dimension κ = 5
is fixed in all experiments.
All the classification and identification decisions are made
based on the LDA feature distance between the fingerprints
under different experiment conditions. The same as in Section
III, the average classification error rates are derived to evaluate
the classification performance, while the false accept rate
(FAR), genuine accept rate (GAR), and equal error rate (EER)
are derived to evaluate the identification performance.
In order to analyze the influence from wireless channels,
we first build fingerprint database and obtain identification
threshold at very small distance (0.1 m). The classifica-
tion/identification performance is also obtained as the best case
for comparison. Then we place the transmitter and receiver
in the aforementioned multipath fading channel and conduct
the experiment in three scenarios. In the first scenario, we
update the reference database and identification threshold at
each new location, which is the common strategy that existing
work adopt. In the second scenario, we do not update the
reference database and check the classification/identification
results. The objective of this scenario is to validate whether the
12
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Fig. 14. Classification results at 0.1m
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Fig. 15. Classification results at 6m with fixed
database.
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Fig. 16. Classification results at 6m without
path loss effects.
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Fig. 17. Classification results at 6m with
updated database
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Fig. 18. Classification results at 1m, 2Ms/s
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Fig. 19. Classification results at 1m, 8Ms/s
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Fig. 20. Classification results at 3m, 256p FFT
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Fig. 21. Classification results at 3m, 512p FFT
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Fig. 22. Classification results at 3m, 1024p
FFT
existing WPLI systems with a universal fingerprint database
and threshold can work with mobile users or in dynamic
channels. Moreover In the third scenario, we do not update
the reference database but normalize the test samples from
different channels and distances. The purpose is to check
whether the path loss is the main source of the channel effects
and whether the normalization can eliminate the influence
from channels.
In order to analyze the influence from the receiver sampling
rate, we set two different sampling rates (i.e., 2 Ms/s and
8 Ms/s) in USRP. Fixed spectrum resolution is used when
building the fingerprints database and extract fingerprints from
incoming signal. The 2 Ms/s sampling rate can only cover
the main lobes of the spectrum while the 8 Ms/s can recover
more side lobe information, as shown in Fig. 5. Whether
the sampling rate effectively covers enough bandwidth is
determined by both the hardware of the receiver and the
modulation/shaping filter of the transmitter. Since the MicaZ
sensors have fixed modulation scheme and shaping filter, the
receiver sampling rate plays major role in our experiments. In
order to check the effects of FFT point number at the receiver,
the same data file is obtained with a single sampling rate
in USRP receiver. However, we use the different FFT point
number in feature extraction to realize the fingerprints with
the same signal bandwidth but different spectrum resolution,
as shown in Fig. 6.
B. Classification Performance
In this group of the experiments, the classification perfor-
mance are tested to capture the effects of channel, database
updating strategy, sampling rates, and FFT point number. The
sensor node #1 and #2 are used as the two genuine users to be
classified. In Fig. 14 - Fig. 22, the x-axis is the index of the
test samples. The first 1000 are samples from Node #1 and
the next 1000 are from Node #2. The y-axis is the minimal
feature distance of each test sample. The color of each testing
sample indicates the original identity of the signal: blue - Node
#1 and red - Node #2. The z-axis is the classification results:
there is a classification error if blue circles appear in upper
level or red circles appear in lower level.
1) Initialization: We start the roll in and the classification at
the close distance (0.1m, fs = 4Ms/s, NFFT = 512). According
to the results shown in Fig. 14, the classification performance
is exceptional where only two samples are wrongly classified,
i.e., the average classification error rate Pe = 0.001.
2) Channel effects: We place the receiver in the aforemen-
tioned non-line-of-sight multipath channel at 6 m away from
transmitter. At first, we do not update the reference database.
The results are shown in Fig. 15 where the classification error
rate Pe = 0.4910, i.e., complete loss of classification capability.
Then in order to check whether the attenuation over distance
(i.e., path loss) is the main impact on the performance, we
eliminate the path loss effects by normalizing the test samples
and redo the classification. The results are shown in Fig. 16
where Pe = 0.4830. The feature distance scores are smaller
but the classification performance is as poor as before. Hence,
we can conclude that path loss is not the main source of the
channel effects and the sample normalization cannot mitigate
the impact.
Finally, we adopt the existing approach to update the
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reference database at the new location before classification.
The results are shown in Fig. 17 where Pe = 0.1388. It
is obvious that the system resume part of the classification
capability if the less practical database updating strategy is
used. However, compared with the results at the close distance,
the performance is much worse due to the multipath channel.
It should be noted that the real indoor or metropolitan channel
can be much worse and hostile than the short-range artificial
multipath channel we build in our experiments.
3) Effects of sampling rate: Due to property of USRP
hardware, the bandwidth of its half-band filter are set to be
W = fs/2. Hence the fingerprint bandwidth BW equals to
the receiver bandwidth W. The classification results can be
influenced by both the two factors. We set the sampling rate
as either fs = 2Ms/s or fs = 8Ms/s. To make sure the
receiver effects are not merged by the channel effects, we put
the receiver only 1 m away from the transmitter and there
is no obstructions in between. To achieve the same spectrum
fingerprinting resolution, NFFT = 256 when fs = 2Ms/s and
NFFT = 1024 when fs = 8Ms/s. The classification results
are shown in Fig. 18 and Fig. 19, where the classification
error rates are Pe = 0.0055 and Pe = 0, respectively. The
higher sampling rate improves the performance by involving
higher frequency spectrum where the RFF is still significant.
However, high sampling rate can help only when the distance
is short, the SNR is high, and the RFF indeed occupy the
higher frequency band. If the transmission distance is high
and the SNR is low, the non-significant RFF may be merged
by noise. Increasing the sampling rate can introduce more
noise if the extra fingerprinting spectrum has low SNR. Hence,
the optimal sampling rate need to be determined by jointly
consider the channel effects, the origin of the RFF, and the
regulation of the modulation scheme and shaping filter.
4) Effects of number of FFT points: To test the effects of
FFT point number, the receiver is again placed at a close
distance at 3 m and the sampling rate is set as fs = 8Ms/s.
The classification results using NFFT = 256, NFFT = 512, and
NFFT = 1024 are shown in Fig. 20, Fig. 21, and Fig. 22, where
the classification error rates are Pe = 0.0255, Pe = 0.004,
and Pe = 0.0035, respectively. There is no clear difference
on the performance with different FFT point number. As the
frequency point where the RFF is significant is not regularly
distributed, the extra FFT points obtained by higher point
number may either pick up the significant RFF or just add
more noise. Hence, there is no need to use ultra high FFT
point number that add additional computation burden.
C. Identification Performance
In this group of the experiments, the above influence factors
are analyzed again but in the identification procedure. The
sensor node #5 is used as the genuine user, while the nodes
#1 #4 are used as the imposters. In Fig. 23 - Fig. 31, the x-
axis is the index of the test samples. The first half of samples
(1000 or 2000) are samples from genuine user #5. The rest of
samples are from imposters. The y-axis is the feature distance
score of each test sample. The horizontal red line is the judging
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Fig. 32. Experimental and theoretical ROC curves.
threshold. The samples below the threshold are identified as
genuine user, otherwise are identified as imposters.
1) Initialization: Similarly to the classification experi-
ments, we start the roll in and the classification at the distance
of 0.1 m. After obtaining the feature distance scores of all the
testing samples, we choose the point, where the equal error
rate EER = 0.0030 is achieved, as the judeging threshold of
the identification system, i.e., λEER = 0.655.
2) Channel effects: Again, we place the receiver in the
artificial non-line-of-sight multipath channel at 6 m away
from transmitter. We fix the reference database and judging
threshold. The results are shown in Fig. 24 where GAR = 0
and FAR = 0. Similar to the classification case, the system
completely lose the identification capability.
Then we eliminate the path loss effects by normalizing the
test samples. The results are shown in Fig. 25 where FAR =
0.0010 and GAR = 0.0305. The identification capability is still
very weak. Hence, we can again conclude that the multipath
channel impact cannot be mitigated by simply compensating
the path loss.
Finally, we update the reference database and reset the
threshold at every new location: not practical in most ap-
plications but the same as most existing WPLI solutions.
The new results are shown in Fig. 26 where the threshold,
λEER = 0.9900, is reset to achieve the EER = 0.3205.
However, the identification performance is still much worse
than the case when distance is short, which is obviously caused
by the effects of multipath channel. Fig. 32 shows the ROC
curve derived in the experiment with the multipath channel and
6 m distance. The theoretical ROC curves under the same SNR
level derived in Section III are also plotted for comparison. We
can clearly see the experimental curve has the best match with
the theoretical Rayleigh ROC curve, which is consistent with
expectation in the non-line-of-sight multipath channel we build
in our lab.
3) Effects of sampling rate: To focus on the effects of the
sampling rate of the receiver, we only use two transmitters, i.e.,
genuine user - Node #5 and imposter - Node #4. 1000 samples
are taken for each device that is 1 m away from each other.
When lower sampling rate are used, i.e., fs = 2Ms/s,NFFT =
256, the results are shown in Fig. 27 where EER = 0.008 and
λEER = 0.892. When higher sampling rate are used, i.e., fs =
8Ms/s,NFFT = 1024, the results are shown in Fig. 27 where
EER = 0 and λEER = 0.537. Obviously, higher sampling rate
improves the identification performance. However, the same
14
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Fig. 23. Identification results at 0.1m.
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Fig. 24. Identification results at 6m, fixed
database
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Fig. 25. Identification results at 6m, without
path loss.
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Fig. 26. Identification results at 6m, updated
database.
Number of Test Samples
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000
Fe
at
ur
e 
D
is
ta
nc
e 
Sc
or
es
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Test Sample
Threshold
Fig. 27. Identification results at 1m,2Ms/s.
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Fig. 28. Identification results at 1m, 8Ms/s.
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Fig. 29. Identification results at 3m, 256p FFT.
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Fig. 30. Identification results at 3m, 512p FFT.
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Fig. 31. Identification results at 3m, 1024p
FFT.
comments as in the classification experiment also apply here.
The effects of the sampling rate are also determined by the
channel, the RFF property, and the modulation/shaping filter.
4) Effects of number of FFT points: Finally, the identi-
fication results with different FFT point number are given
in Fig. 29, Fig. 30, and Fig. 31. The data are collected at
3m, with 8 Ms/s sampling rate. The equal error rates and
threshold for the each case are EER = 0.01, λEER = 0.5150;
EER = 0, λEER = 1.129; and EER = 0.01, λEER = 0.5150.
Again, similar conclusion as the classification experiments can
be obtained here: extra FFT points do not have clear effects on
the identification performance due to the irregularly distributed
RFF along the spectrum.
V. Conclusion
In this work, we rigorously evaluate the influence of real-
world constraints along every single step in the WPLI tech-
niques, using a new theoretical model and in-lab experiments.
The theoretical model provide the first systematical description
on the whole WPLI procedure, which is applicable in most
WPLI that based on digital wireless communications. The
model is then implemented to comprehensively characterize
various WPLI techniques that utilize the frequency domain
RFF from the non-linear RF front-end, with different settings
in transmitters, receivers, and wireless channels. From both
theoretical deduction and experiment validation, we reveal
several key influence factors in real-world applications, in-
cluding the constraints in wireless regulation, the origins of
RFFs, the multipath fading channel and mobile users, and the
sophistication of the receiver device. Our results show that
existing WPLI techniques is less likely to achieve acceptable
accuracy in real-world operation environments with off-the-
shelf wireless devices, which motivate the discovery of new
sources of more reliable and differentiable RFFs.
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